Blog

By Dolly (Xinyu) Hu

A legal reading of the FCC's decision to add foreign-produced advanced robotic devices to the Covered List, and what Chinese robotics companies should do next

Keywords: robotics going global; embodied AI; U.S. market access; supply chain security

On July 28, 2026, the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau of the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) issued Public Notice DA 26-786, announcing that foreign-produced advanced robotic devices, together with foreign-produced power inverters, had been added to the FCC Covered List. The notice concerns WC Docket No. 18-89, ET Docket No. 21-232, and EA Docket No. 21-233.

For Chinese robotics companies, this development is far more significant than an ordinary change in FCC radio-frequency certification practice. Under the FCC's current rules, equipment on the Covered List may not obtain new Equipment Authorization. The FCC's own fact sheet further states that newly covered foreign-produced advanced robotic devices will generally be unable to secure the FCC authorization needed for lawful importation, marketing, or sale in the United States. For new overseas models that require FCC authorization, the ordinary route into the U.S. market is therefore, in practical terms, largely closed.

The policy also extends well beyond humanoid robots. Quadrupeds, autonomous mobile robots (AMRs), delivery robots, robotic lawn mowers, and even certain consumer robot vacuums may fall within the definition if they satisfy the technical criteria. By contrast, fixed industrial robots and some medical devices are expressly excluded.

For Chinese robotics manufacturers, this is now a market-access issue that must be handled jointly by R&D, supply chain, cybersecurity, U.S. counsel, and senior management.

I. What kind of legal action is this under U.S. law?

In formal terms, DA 26-786 is a Public Notice issued by the FCC's Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau. It is neither an act of Congress nor a brand-new federal regulation adopted through a full notice-and-comment rulemaking. Its legal force instead rests on three pre-existing layers of U.S. law.

First, Congress enacted the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019, which requires the FCC to maintain a Covered List of communications equipment and services that have been determined by the relevant U.S. national-security authorities to pose an "unacceptable risk" to the national security of the United States or the safety of U.S. persons. The FCC's implementing rules in 47 C.F.R. Sections 1.50002 and 1.50003 govern the maintenance and updating of that list.

Second, the Secure Equipment Act of 2021 and the FCC's later equipment-authorization rules connect the Covered List directly to market access. Under 47 C.F.R. Section 2.903, equipment on the Covered List may not receive Equipment Authorization. That restriction reaches products that would otherwise proceed through certification, a Supplier's Declaration of Conformity, or even certain authorization-exempt pathways.

Third, the immediate trigger for the July 2026 update was a national-security determination submitted to the FCC by the relevant executive-branch authorities on July 27, 2026. According to the FCC materials, foreign-produced advanced robotic devices were found to present two categories of "unacceptable risk": supply-chain vulnerabilities that could affect the U.S. economy and national security, and cybersecurity risks created by connected robots that may threaten critical infrastructure and the safety of U.S. persons.

This institutional design is important because it explains the FCC's role. In the Covered List framework, the FCC has repeatedly characterized list updates as largely non-discretionary and ministerial once a qualifying external national-security determination has been made. In other words, once the relevant national-security authorities act, the FCC is expected to update the list without reopening the entire underlying policy through another round of notice-and-comment proceedings.

1. How can an item be removed from the Covered List?

The FCC's rules require continued monitoring of the external national-security determinations that support a Covered List designation. If the relevant external determination is withdrawn, and no other statutory basis remains to support the listing, the FCC should remove the affected equipment or service from the Covered List.

Applied to the present robotics rule, that means one of the most important prerequisites for reopening the ordinary path to U.S. market access would be a material change in the national-security determination underlying the July 2026 action.

The Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau does not appear to have meaningful room to reverse the judgment of the national-security authorities on its own. The FCC's July 28, 2026 fact sheet likewise states that, under the Secure Networks Act, the agency updates the Covered List based on qualifying directions from the relevant national-security authorities.

2. Could litigation meaningfully change the rule?

Judicial review is possible, but the odds of a near-term systemic reversal appear limited. In Hikvision USA, Inc. v. FCC, decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in 2024, the court reviewed the Covered List regime and the related equipment-authorization framework. The court largely upheld the FCC's authority to keep Covered List equipment out of the market, while granting relief only with respect to an overbroad interpretation of "critical infrastructure."

That decision shows that national-security regulation remains reviewable in court. At the same time, where Congress has spoken clearly and the executive branch has made a national-security judgment, U.S. courts generally give substantial weight to the political branches.

For companies planning their U.S. strategy over the next three to five years, it would therefore be imprudent to assume that this policy will be rolled back in the short term. More realistic response paths focus on product classification, Conditional Approval, maintenance of existing authorizations, and local manufacturing arrangements.

II. Which robots are actually covered?

The Covered List entry uses the formal phrase "foreign-produced advanced robotic devices," except for advanced robotic devices that qualify under the Conditional Approval mechanism described in the FCC materials.

The FCC also makes clear that the new entry is based on place of production rather than the identity of any single company. If a product falls within the defined category of a foreign-produced advanced robotic device, it is not decisive whether the manufacturer is Chinese, American, Japanese, or European.

This marks a meaningful shift from earlier Covered List entries, which directly named companies such as Huawei, ZTE, Hikvision, and Dahua. In recent years, U.S. regulation has moved from entity-specific restrictions toward a combination of product category and production-location analysis. Foreign-produced unmanned aircraft systems and key components were added in late 2025; foreign-produced routers followed in March 2026; and in July 2026 the regime expanded again to advanced robotics and power inverters.

1. "Advanced robotic device" is defined through technical criteria

The national-security determination uses a technology-based definition rather than an industry label. In principle, a product must be a mechanically mobile device – including AMRs, humanoid robots, and quadrupeds – and must also satisfy a group of core conditions.

Those conditions include ground mobility, navigation or obstacle-avoidance capability, operation at some distance from a human operator based on human commands, sensor input, or both, and a combined weight of more than 4.4 pounds for the robot together with its ground or docking station. The device must also include environmental sensing, wired or wireless connectivity capable of at least 200 kbps in both directions, and software that controls autonomous navigation, motion awareness, data collection, or remote command-and-control. The software concept expressly includes local or remote firmware as well as AI or machine-learning model weights.

From a compliance perspective, that means ordinary product-specification details suddenly take on legal significance. Is the LiDAR a qualifying environmental sensor? What data are the camera and microphone collecting? What level of connectivity is enabled through Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, cellular, or satellite links? Does the AI model participate in navigation, perception, or control? Can the robot receive remote instructions through an app or the cloud? Can OTA updates change the device's mobility or control functions?

Those questions can directly affect whether a product falls within the definition.

2. Quadrupeds, humanoids, and AMRs are high-exposure categories

The supporting materials for the national-security determination directly refer to four-legged quadrupeds, bipeds, and wheeled or tracked vehicles, while discussing uses in physical security, industrial inspection, manufacturing, and military settings.

As a result, quadruped robot dogs and humanoid robots are among the most clearly affected product categories. Warehousing AMRs, delivery robots, and inspection robots using wheels or tracks also face a high likelihood of coverage if they meet the weight, sensing, network-connectivity, and software-control criteria.

Importantly, the definition is not limited to "industrial," "military," or "humanoid" products. FCC-related FAQs and professional U.S. legal commentary indicate that robot vacuums and robotic lawn mowers may also be covered if they satisfy the definition.

3. AI is not an independent trigger, but it is now part of the FCC's risk analysis

The July 2026 action does not establish a stand-alone AI licensing regime. But AI and machine-learning model weights are expressly written into the software element of the definition.

The regulatory logic is clear: environmental sensing leads to data collection; data collection interacts with network connectivity; software and AI process the information; remote or autonomous control becomes possible; and physical action follows. The national-security determination specifically discusses the risk that foreign-produced robots may collect high-value environmental data, create remote-access vulnerabilities, or be commandeered by malicious actors. It also highlights the intelligence value of LiDAR, electro-optical, infrared, acoustic, and thermal sensors.

For embodied-AI companies, this means U.S. market access can no longer be analyzed by separating AI safety, cybersecurity, and hardware supply-chain issues into isolated silos.

4. Which robots are expressly excluded?

The source materials list several exclusions, including connected vehicles, rail-only vehicles, unmanned aircraft and UAS, unmanned underwater devices, certain medical and surgical robots operating within the relevant FDA framework, external prosthetics and mobility-assistance devices, and fixed, stationary, non-mobile robots.

That final category is especially important for Chinese industrial robotics companies. The materials expressly exclude fixed industrial or medical robots such as articulating robots, parallel or delta robots, Cartesian or gantry robots, and SCARA-type devices.

A robotics company therefore cannot rely on broad industry labels alone when assessing U.S. exposure. A fixed industrial arm and a networked, autonomous, environmentally aware mobile robot occupy very different legal positions under the July 2026 rule.

III. What does "foreign-produced" mean?

The national-security determination uses a definition that supply-chain teams should treat with particular seriousness. It states that a "foreign-produced" product is one that does not satisfy the definition of a "domestic end product" under 48 C.F.R. Section 25.101(a). In effect, the FCC has borrowed the domestic-end-product test from the Buy American framework.

This means that manufacturing location and bill-of-materials composition now enter FCC market-access analysis for robotics in a direct and unusually concrete way.

Simply establishing a U.S. subsidiary will not change a device's production status. Final packaging in the United States will not automatically make the product a domestic end product either. Companies need to examine the U.S. manufacturing process, domestic component-cost ratios, and related requirements in detail.

For businesses that rely heavily on Chinese motors, reducers, controllers, LiDAR, cameras, batteries, and other core components, this path may require genuine supply-chain restructuring. The cost and timing of that exercise must be evaluated against the commercial value of the U.S. market.

IV. What happens once a product is on the Covered List?

Under 47 C.F.R. Section 2.903(a), equipment on the Covered List may not obtain FCC Equipment Authorization. More importantly, subsection (c) extends the prohibition to products that would otherwise proceed through certification, a Supplier's Declaration of Conformity, or certain authorization-exempt pathways. The FCC's own fact sheet puts the market consequence in very direct terms: covered equipment cannot receive new FCC authorization, and because most electronic devices require such authorization before importation, marketing, or sale, new covered devices will generally be unable to enter the U.S. market lawfully.

From the perspective of a Chinese robotics company launching new products abroad, that is extremely close to shutting down the ordinary route to U.S. entry.

1. Existing authorized models have not been automatically removed

The FCC has stated that the July 28, 2026 update does not affect consumers who already purchased covered equipment and does not prevent retailers from continuing to import, market, or sell existing models that had already received FCC equipment authorization before that date. The immediate effect falls on new device models.

For companies, that means the first operational task is not to ask whether the company "has FCC approval" in some general sense. Instead, businesses should build a model-by-model compliance ledger covering the model number, FCC ID, authorization date, hardware version, RF module, and firmware version. An older model and its next-generation successor may now occupy completely different legal positions in the United States.

2. OTA and firmware updates for existing models are also constrained, though the FCC has issued a limited waiver

On the same day, the FCC issued DA 26-789. Because Covered List equipment is ordinarily subject to restrictions on certain permissive changes under 47 C.F.R. Sections 2.932(b) and 2.1043(b), the FCC's Office of Engineering and Technology granted a limited waiver for advanced robotic devices that had already been approved before July 28, 2026.

At least through January 1, 2029, those devices may still receive certain Class I and Class II software and firmware updates designed to reduce consumer risk, maintain functionality, fix vulnerabilities, and preserve operating-system compatibility.

This matters greatly for embodied-AI and smart-robotics companies. Any OTA plan that changes firmware, wireless functions, AI models, or motion-control capability may require analysis of whether the existing FCC authorization still covers the product. Hardware changes may independently trigger the need for a new application. In practical terms, product, engineering, certification, and legal teams should treat changes to mainboards, wireless modules, antennas, output power, AI-control capability, and firmware architecture as part of a formal change-control process.

V. Are there still any viable paths into the U.S. market?

At least at the current stage, three paths remain commercially meaningful enough to study.

1. Conditional Approval

DA 26-786 preserves a Conditional Approval mechanism. In principle, a foreign-produced advanced robotic device manufacturer may apply for review, and if the relevant national-security authorities make the required determination that a specific device or device category does not present the identified unacceptable risks, that product may qualify for an exception and continue to obtain FCC authorization.

This path should be understood accurately. It is not simply an upgraded version of the traditional FCC workflow built around test reports and submissions to a telecommunications certification body. Available public guidance and professional commentary indicate that applicants may need to disclose ownership and control, supply-chain details, bill-of-materials information, and a concrete timetable for establishing or expanding U.S. manufacturing.

For Chinese robotics companies that still view the United States as a strategic market, Conditional Approval means legal and compliance teams should begin organizing corporate-control information, component sourcing, manufacturing location data, software provenance, data architecture, remote-access design, cybersecurity controls, and any proposed U.S. manufacturing plan well in advance. Because the public record is still thin, however, it would be unwise to promise business teams any particular likelihood of approval at this stage.

2. Designing the product as a domestic end product

Because the rule is tied to production status, equipment that satisfies the domestic-end-product test does not fall within the foreign-produced category. In theory, the legal pathway is straightforward. In practice, the commercial difficulty depends on the product's real supply chain.

Companies should examine their BOM line by line. Which core components must change sourcing? Which manufacturing steps must move to the United States? Can the domestic-content ratio meet the applicable threshold? Should a next-generation product be designed with a U.S.-specific supply chain from the start?

3. Keeping the product outside the definition of an advanced robotic device

This path is especially important for industrial robotics companies. If the device is a fixed industrial robot or another clearly excluded category, the company should prepare a full classification memorandum addressing its mechanical structure, mobility, communication capabilities, sensors, weight, software-control functions, and intended use.

Actual product functionality controls the legal analysis. Marketing labels, customs codes, or internal descriptions such as "automation equipment" cannot substitute for the technical legal test.

VI. A broader trend: U.S. robotics regulation is moving from company lists to technology categories and supply-chain origin

Historically, the Covered List had a strongly entity-based character. Specific companies – Huawei, ZTE, Hytera, Hikvision, Dahua, and others – were directly named. Since late 2025, however, the framework has clearly expanded. Foreign-produced UAS and key components were added first, followed by foreign-produced consumer-grade routers, and then foreign-produced advanced robotic devices and power inverters.

For Chinese robotics companies, this is an important warning. Traditional export-control and sanctions screening usually begins with questions such as: Are we on the Entity List? Are any shareholders SDNs? Have any suppliers been sanctioned?

Those questions remain relevant, but they are no longer enough. Companies must now add another group of questions: Has our entire product category entered the U.S. national-security regulatory field? Where is the product manufactured? Where do the key components come from? What environmental data does the robot collect? Who can access it remotely? Who signs the firmware? Where does the AI model run? Can a China-based backend control robots deployed in the United States?

The FCC's national-security determination has already placed those issues in one integrated risk framework. For embodied-AI businesses, that means cybersecurity, data governance, AI governance, and supply-chain compliance now directly influence market access.

VII. Practical compliance recommendations for Chinese robotics companies

For companies already in the U.S. market – or planning to enter it – the most sensible immediate step is a fresh market-access review conducted model by model.

• Build a U.S. authorization ledger immediately. Use July 28, 2026 as the key dividing line and separate current sales models, launch-ready models, and R&D-stage models. Existing FCC IDs and authorization dates should be verified one by one.
• Classify each SKU under the advanced-robotic-device definition. Do not assume that a conclusion at the company, brand, or product-line level is sufficient. Focus on mobility, sensors, network speed, weight, remote-control capability, and AI or firmware control architecture.
• Bring FCC compliance into engineering change management. Before major changes are made to mainboards, Wi-Fi or Bluetooth modules, antennas, motor-control systems, AI models, firmware, or OTA functions, engineering, certification, and legal teams should jointly assess the impact on existing authorizations.
• Study Conditional Approval early if the U.S. market remains strategically important. Supply-chain disclosure and U.S.-manufacturing planning cannot realistically be assembled only a few months before launch.
• Conduct both legal and financial analysis before describing a product as "U.S.-made." Final assembly in the United States and domestic-end-product status are not the same thing. A real BOM-based and process-based localization analysis is required before management can evaluate commercial feasibility.
• Treat cybersecurity as a market-access asset. Secure boot, firmware signing, SBOMs, secure OTA, account controls, remote-command authentication, vulnerability-disclosure processes, data minimization, and local processing should all be documented in a way that can be shown externally. The July 2026 national-security determination places remote access, data collection, and the risk of a robot being commandeered at the center of the analysis.
• Avoid overdependence on a single market. The United States remains commercially important, but the policy cost of entry has risen significantly. Companies in consumer robots, quadrupeds, humanoids, and mobile service robotics should also build a serious second-market strategy.

As of now, markets in the Middle East, Japan, South Korea, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand present very different mixes of purchasing power, robotics regulation, AI policy, wireless-access requirements, data protection, and consumer-liability exposure. Market selection should therefore consider not only GDP and certification cost, but also policy stability and the future risk of restrictions on foreign intelligent devices.

Conclusion: for new models, the practical result is very close to a market ban

As a matter of formal legal wording, the current framework still leaves room for existing models, Conditional Approval, domestic-end-product restructuring, and exclusion from the definition itself.

But for a typical Chinese mobile-robotics company that plans to manufacture a new quadruped, humanoid robot, or AMR in China and then enter the U.S. market through the traditional path of obtaining FCC Equipment Authorization, the July 2026 framework creates a very substantial barrier. For products that satisfy the definition, need new FCC authorization, and remain foreign-produced, the ordinary route to U.S. market entry is now materially restricted.

The long-term significance lies in the regulatory logic itself. The FCC Covered List has expanded from traditional communications hardware to UAS, routers, advanced robotics, and power inverters. The regulatory focus is also moving beyond company identity toward product category and supply-chain origin.

Embodied-AI products combine environmental sensing, connectivity, AI computation, remote control, and physical execution. As robots move further into homes, factories, warehouses, energy facilities, and public spaces, U.S. national-security attention to them is unlikely to decline. That is a trend assessment based on the current regulatory trajectory, not a prediction of any specific future legislation.

For Chinese robotics companies, three business questions now need to be answered at the same time: how much resource the U.S. market still deserves; what manufacturing and technical architecture should be adopted if U.S. entry remains a priority; and where the company's second market should be if U.S. policy continues to tighten.

Robotics going global has entered a new phase. Product performance and cost still matter, but companies that hope to remain overseas for the long term must now place market access, supply-chain origin, AI governance, cybersecurity, data architecture, and policy stability on the same globalization roadmap.

General disclaimer

This article is based on publicly available U.S. laws, FCC materials, and industry sources available as of August 11, 2026. It is intended for general legal research and industry discussion only and does not constitute U.S. legal advice for any specific company or product. Whether a particular product qualifies as an advanced robotic device, whether it is foreign-produced, whether an existing FCC authorization remains usable, and whether Conditional Approval is feasible all require model-specific analysis based on the product's FCC ID, hardware version, software functionality, manufacturing process, and bill of materials.

Selected references

• FCC Public Notice DA 26-786 (July 28, 2026), announcing the addition of foreign-produced advanced robotic devices and power inverters to the Covered List.
• FCC Fact Sheet (July 28, 2026), explaining the practical effect of the Covered List update.
• 47 C.F.R. Sections 1.50002, 1.50003, and 2.903.
• 48 C.F.R. Section 25.101(a), defining "domestic end product."
• FCC Public Notice DA 26-789 (July 28, 2026), regarding the waiver for certain permissive changes.
• Hikvision USA, Inc. v. FCC, 97 F.4th 938 (D.C. Cir. 2024).

Author

Dolly (Xinyu) Hu is a lawyer at Beijing Dongwei (Shenzhen) Law Firm and heads the firm's International Trade & Logistics Practice. She focuses on international trade, overseas expansion compliance, cross-border logistics, overseas warehousing, cross-border e-commerce, and international dispute resolution.